Electronic
Voting Machines (EVMs) have significantly transformed the electoral landscape
since their inception in the 1960s. This article delves into the history,
evolution, and global perspectives surrounding EVMs, with a particular focus on
India's pioneering adoption. Electronic
Voting Machines were introduced to overcome challenges associated with
traditional paper ballots. The initial concept emerged in the United States in
the 1960s, aiming to enhance the efficiency and accuracy of the voting
process. The early prototypes of EVMs
underwent several iterations to address technological limitations and ensure
reliability. The evolution of these machines paved the way for their widespread
use in elections worldwide.
India embraced EVMs in the
1980s, recognizing their potential to streamline the electoral process. By
2004, the nation fully transitioned to EVMs for national elections, marking a
significant milestone in electoral technology adoption.
The Commission in December,
1977 mooted the idea of EVM to overcome certain problems associated with use of
ballot papers and taking advantage of development of technology so that voters
cast their votes correctly without any resultant ambiguity and removing the
possibilities of invalid votes totally.
MB Haneefa invented the first
Indian voting machine in 1980. It was first used in 1981 in the by-election to
North Paravur Assembly Constituency of Kerala in 50 polling stations. The EVMs
were commissioned in 1989 by Election Commission of India in collaboration with
Bharat Electronics Limited and Electronics Corporation of India Limited.
The law was amended by the
Parliament in December, 1988 and a new section 61A was inserted in the
Representation of the People Act, 1951 empowering the Commission to use voting
machines. The amended provision came into force with effect from 15th March,
1989.
From
Ballot to Machine. Electronic Voting Machine was
introduced in India to solve the problem of Ballot Box capturing and casting of
false vote, which was a common scenario in India while using the Ballot Paper.
Another constraint of the
pre-EVM era was the high proportion of invalid votes. Many people found it
difficult to put the stamp in the allocated space.
In addition, the cost of paper
ballots and the prolonged drudgery of the polling staff was an additional
burden.
Hence, the Indian Parliament
decided to use Electronic Voting Machine by Election Commission of India to
Conduct General and State elections in India.
EVMs in India consists of a
Ballot Unit, buttons in front of the name of respective Candidates or Political
Parties, for the voters and a Control Unit which is operated by the booth officer.
Studies have been conducted
which have shown that EVMs have reduced electoral fraud and re-polling due to
electoral rigging, and made elections a safe affair, thereby enhancing voter
turnout.
An
EVM being used by ECI can record a maximum of 2,000 votes. In case of M2 EVMs (2006-10), EVMs can cater
to a maximum of 64 candidates including NOTA. In case of M3 EVMs (Post 2013),
EVMs can cater to a maximum of 384 candidates including NOTA.
Storage of EVMs
during non-election period.
During non-election periods, Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) are stored and
maintained in a secure manner to ensure their integrity and prevent tampering.
The specific procedures may vary by country or region, but generally, the
following measures are taken to safeguard the EVMs:
Storage Facilities. EVMs are stored in designated and secure
storage facilities that are typically guarded and monitored 24/7. These
facilities may be government-owned or contracted from private entities.
Security Measures. Storage facilities are equipped with security
measures such as CCTV cameras, access control systems, and alarms to deter and
detect any unauthorized access.
Tamper-Evident Seals. EVMs are sealed with
tamper-evident seals after elections. These seals are designed to show signs of
tampering, making it evident if someone tries to open the machine.
Regular Inspections. Periodic inspections are conducted to ensure
the physical integrity of the stored EVMs. This may include checks on the
seals, hardware components, and other relevant aspects.
Climate-Controlled Environment.
EVMs are stored in a climate-controlled
environment to prevent damage from extreme temperatures, humidity, or other
environmental factors.
Inventory Management. An inventory management system is maintained
to keep track of all EVMs. The number of machines, their condition, and their
location are recorded and monitored.
Authorized Access. Only authorized personnel, such as election
commission officials or designated technicians, are allowed access to the
storage facilities. Access logs are often maintained to track who enters the
storage area and when.
Training and Awareness. Personnel involved in the storage and
maintenance of EVMs are trained to follow strict protocols and security
measures. They are made aware of the importance of their role in ensuring the
integrity of the electoral process.
Regular Maintenance: Routine maintenance checks
may be carried out on the EVMs to ensure that they are in working order when
needed for the next election.
These
measures collectively aim to maintain the security, functionality, and
integrity of Electronic Voting Machines during non-election periods. The goal
is to ensure that the machines are ready for use in the next election cycle and
that any attempts at tampering or unauthorized access are promptly detected.
Transfer of EVMs during
the poll:
First randomization.
EVMs are allocated randomly to various
Assembly segments through software in the presence of party representatives. From this point, the Returning Officer (RO)
of the Assembly segment takes charge of the allocated machines and stores them
in designated rooms.
Second randomization.
EVMs are commissioned to specific polling
stations in the presence of party representatives.
After
candidate setting, which is the process of preparing EVMs after names of
candidates are final, the strong room is sealed in the presence of party
representatives. Once sealed, the strong
room can only be opened on a fixed date and time when the machines have to be handed
over to the designated polling stations.
Some reserve EVMs are also taken from the strong rooms and stored in a
central place in the Assembly segment in order to replace the defective
machines.
The
Controversy. Electronic Voting Machines in
the recent times in India have become the topic of debate. As there have been
various reports on EVM came up, that it can be tampered easily and the votes of
one political party or candidate can be easily transferred to another.
Many incidents have aroused
which has made the public doubt the authenticity of EVMs such as technical
glitches where EVMs have stopped responding and multiple people claiming that
the system is hack-able.
Countries like Germany,
Ireland, U.S.A. and Italy which are more technologically sound than India have
also have doubted the transparency of EVM machines from time to time and have
even banned the use of these machines in there elections.
However, the Election
Commission of India has repeatedly denied from time to time the possibility of
tampering of EVMs and also have given reports on EVM can’t be tampered and has
also challenged publicly to temper the EVM for a prize.
But
the recent controversy raised the eye-brows of some sincere thinkable persons. Ahead
of counting of votes for the Assembly elections in five states in Nov 2023,
there were accusations on the ruling party of stealing votes as a truck carrying
EVMs in Varanasi was intercepted.
Reclaiming
the Faith
Rather than throwing the baby
out with the bathwater, a couple of procedural changes will bring in
credibility to the voting process.
The EC has already operationalized
the voter-verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT) with an attached printer that
provides a paper trail for those who have cast their votes.
At present, after casting the
vote in EVMs, the printed paper is directly dropped in the box (the voter only
has seven seconds to see this). Instead, the paper should be given to the voter
who should then drop it in the ballot box. This was the procedure before the
introduction of EVMs.
In the current system, to ask
for a counting of ballots from the VVPAT, one has to move the courts. Instead,
the ECI should introduce a new procedure wherein the manual counting of the
printed ballots has to be done before announcing the result if the difference between the
winner and the loser is less than, say, 10%, and the loser demands a recount.
In a democracy, there is
perhaps nothing more important than the credibility of the electoral process
therefore in a democracy, elections should not only be fair but should be seen
to be fair. By shoring up its image and bringing in some more transparent
reforms, the EC can restore faith in elections.
EVMs offer numerous advantages,
including faster tabulation, reduced chances of human error, and enhanced
accessibility. These benefits contributed to their widespread acceptance in
India.
Despite
the particular advantages to electronic voting system, there are also draw
backs to the system. The cons of the electronic voting system should be considered
seriously by all concerned before taking any kind of random decision on
e-voting. These are:
Vulnerability to hacking. According to the Congressional Research Service
of Election Reform and Electronic Voting Systems, vendors and election jurisdictions
generally state that they do not transmit election results from precincts via
the internet, but they may transmit them via a direct modem connection or
Virtual Private Network (VPN). However, even this approach may be subject to
attack via the internet, especially if encryption and verification are not
sufficient. That is because telephone transmission systems are themselves
increasingly connected to the internet and computers to which the receiving
server may be connected, such as through a local area network (LAN), may have
internet connections. So, using internet would be out of the question in case
of Bangladesh where we continuously have history of suspicion over electoral
fraud.
Voter verified paper audit
trails. All fully-electronic (touch screen, DRE,
internet) voting systems are subject to the limitations and risks of computer
technology. This includes the inability to detect the presence of hardware
and/or software that could be used, deliberately or inadvertently, to alter election
outcomes. According to Rebecca Mercuri, PhD, president, Notable Software,
democratic elections require independent verification that all balloting
choices have been recorded as intended and vote totals have been reliably and
indisputably created from the same material examined by the voters. A Voter Verified Paper Ballot (VVPB) provides
an auditable way to assure voters that their ballots will be available to be
counted. Without VVPB there is no way to independently audit the election
results.
Susceptibility to fraud. Voting fraud is not either present everywhere or
absent everywhere. Especially in our country, there have always been allegations
of fraud by all the losing political parties. Fraud comes in degrees and
increments. A malicious voting system created and distributed by one vendor to
hundreds of thousands of polling booths, can systematically falsify millions of
votes. Although some may believe that tampering with an electronic voting machine
is extremely hard to do, computer scientists have tampered with machines to
prove that it is quite easily done.
However, if people have access to the machines, and know how to work
them, they can take the memory card out of the machine, which stores the votes,
and in place they put their own memory card with a virus that can tamper with
the votes. It is a fraud on a large scale and wholesale level. Stuffing a ballot box, in contrast, works at
a retail level. A tamperer, however malicious and
skilled, can stuff only as many ballots as might plausibly be cast at the
polling place, but a faulty and corrupted voting system (malicious DRE
software) could affect far more votes.
Accuracy in capturing voters’
intent. If a touch screen is used in the elections,
the sensors in touch screen devices can be knocked out of alignment by shock
and vibration that may occur during transport. Unless these sensors are realigned
at the polling place prior to the start of voting, touch screen machines can
misinterpret a voter’s intent. For example, a voter might touch the part of the
screen identified with candidate X, but candidate Y’s would light up instead.
Political ties of manufacturers.
The present government’s decision not to keep
the provision of caretaker government and to hold next general election under a
political government and the election commission, has made the attempt of
using e-voting system more unreasonable
and unfair. Our election commission itself were also subject to considerable
amount of criticism because of its controversial comments and actions during
the emergency period after January 11 takeover, and also during the last 2008
general elections. Considering our political culture, it is undeniably a fact
that any manufacturer or company hired for the e-voting system will tailor the
e-voting machines according to the ‘needs’ of the current political party in
power. So these machines will be subject to scrutiny, distrust and inquiry from
all the other political parties in the country.
Malicious software programming.
Any computer
software is basically generated from software programming and coding. And all
these softwares could be tampered with by a computer programmer who knows the
source code. Testing electronic voting systems for security problems, especially
if they were intentionally introduced and concealed, is basically impossible.
If malicious coding is inserted by programmers into commercial software that
are triggered by obscure combinations of commands and keystrokes via the
computer keyboard, then election results can change completely.
Physical security of machines. Regarding physical hardware controls, many of
the DRE (direct recording electronic voting machine) models under examination
contained weaknesses in controls designed to protect the system. According to
the USA Government Accountability office, all the locks on a particular DRE
model were easily picked, and were all controlled by the same keys. Also a
particular model of DRE was linked together with others to form a rudimentary
network. If one of these machines were accidentally or intentionally unplugged
from the others, voting functions on the other machines in the network would be
disrupted. In addition, reviewers found that switches used to turn a DRE system
on or off, as well as those used to close the polls on a particular DRE
terminal, were not protected.
Secure storage of cast votes. The votes that are cast using the electronic
voting machines, are stored in a safe storage or space in the computer machine
memory. But, Doug Jones, PhD, Professor of Computer Science at University of
Iowa explained in his book, Secure Electronic Voting, ‘For over a decade, all
direct recording electronic machines have been required to contain redundant
storage, but this redundant storage is not an independent record of the votes,
because it is created by the same software that created the original record. As
a result, the multiple files are of limited use to check the correctness of the
software.’
Electronic
Voting Machines (EVMs) have emerged as a contentious element in the democratic
process, with an increasing number of concerns pointing towards their
disadvantages outweighing the purported advantages. While the intention behind
introducing EVMs was to streamline and modernize the electoral process, the
persistent issues of security vulnerabilities, lack of transparency, and the
potential for manipulation have cast a shadow on their credibility.
One
of the primary disadvantages of EVMs is the vulnerability to hacking and
tampering, raising questions about the integrity of election outcomes. The lack
of a verifiable paper trail further exacerbates these concerns, making it difficult
to conduct meaningful audits and ensure the accuracy of the results.
Additionally, the technological complexity of EVMs has created a barrier for
citizens to fully understand the voting process, diminishing the transparency
essential for a healthy democracy.
Moreover,
instances of malfunctioning machines, software glitches, and technical errors
have been reported during various elections, leading to the disenfranchisement
of voters and eroding public trust in the electoral system. The prevalence of
these issues underscores the need for a more reliable and foolproof method of
conducting elections.
Given
these substantial drawbacks, it is imperative to consider alternative methods
of voting that prioritize both security and transparency. One of the
recommended solutions is a return to paper ballots, accompanied by stringent
audit processes to ensure the accuracy of the results. This traditional
approach not only addresses the concerns associated with electronic systems but
also provides a tangible and easily verifiable record of each vote cast.
In
conclusion, the continued use of Electronic Voting Machines poses a significant
risk to the democratic foundation, and the identified disadvantages outweigh
any potential benefits. As custodians of democracy, it is crucial for
policymakers to prioritize the sanctity of the electoral process and consider
alternative, more reliable methods. Banning EVMs in favor of a more
transparent, secure, and accessible voting system is a step towards reinforcing
public trust and upholding the fundamental principles of democracy.
